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Refugees from Suriname 
by Betty Sedoc-Dahlberg 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in Washington published a brief report on 
the situation of human rights in Suriname in October 1983 following a visit of a special com- 
mission in June o f  that year. The report questions the government's expressed intention to 
allow for the expression of popular will or to permit freedom in the media. The Commission 
concluded that serious violations of important human rights occurred. 
The International Commission o f  Jurists in Geneva also published a report entitled "Human 
Rights in Suriname" which concluded that "the chain of events since 1980 demonstrates an 
escalation in the military authority's disregard for the rule of law, which is set aside whenever 
they consider it necessary for the consolidation o f  their position. " This characteristic report 
provides background information to the creation o f  refugees from Suriname in the 
Netherlands. 
Introduction 
The lack of political responsibility by 
the weak Surinamese governments is 
demonstrated through the absence of in- 
terest in the migration of 25% of the 
population to the Netherlands. Increas- 
ing social unrest gave rise to an uninter- 
ested and uncaring attitude towards the 
migration of professionals, technicians, 
and skilled workers since the fifties: in 
the sixties and seventies, the so-called 
crisis strata and socially explosive 
elements of the society followed. More- 
over, after the 1980 military take-over 
by non-commissioned officers, the 
power elites developed strategies to en- 
courage migration of so-called "destab- 
ilizing" countrymen. A massacre in 
December 1982 by the nearly three-year 
old leftist junta led to the involuntary 
migration to the Netherlands of more 
than one thousand persons of several 
ethnic groups. 
These migrants consisted mainly of 
politicians (of the left and right among 
whom were some disgraced ex-members 
of the military government), academics, 
students, teachers, administrators, trade 
union leaders, entrepreneurs and jour- 
nalists. Many of these civilians are 
spokesmen, representatives or asso- 
ciates of political parties, religious 
organizations, labour unions and other 
professional organizations that in 
November 1982 urged general elections 
and the return of the army to their bar- 
racks. They form a category apart in 
Holland and are loosely organized in 
several bodies (which connect them 
with their homeland) among which the 
National Liberation Council is the most 
prominent. In the past 14 months of 
their existence, many Surinamese 
refugees have been engaged in a struggle 
for survival. Those who have found 
jobs and housing accommodation ap- 
pear to lose their direct interest and in- 
volvement in the liberation movement. 
Surinamese in the Netherlands 
The former colonial powers have often 
served as places of escape in times of 
uncertainty and persecution in newly 
independent nations. With reference to 
Suriname, some specific characteristics 
have to be taken into account which ex- 
plain the continuation of an exclusive 
Dutch orientation. Two important 
characteristics are the Dutch language 
and educational system, which isolate 
Suriname from the Western Hemi- 
sphere. Within the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, the Dutch Antilles, which 
are located in the Caribbean Sea, are the 
exception. Thus, a concentration of 
Surinamese on some of these islands is 
not surprising. 
However, even before independence in 
1975, it is estimated that 20% of the 
Surinamese population was living in 
Holland. Many Surinamese migrant 
families in Holland have served for two 
generations as reception centers for 
thousands of Surinamese facing prob- 
lems in their home country. Further- 
more, the changing political elites and 
power aggregates have often caused 
many migrants to remain temporarily in 
Holland. 
Significant migration to Holland began 
in the 20th Century and became visible 
after the 1940's, when more members of 
well-to-do Creole and Jewish families 
left for Holland, followed in the 1960's 
and 1970's by members of other ethnic 
groups and representatives of other 
socioeconomic strata. 
Since the 1970fs, the Dutch government 
has tried to establish migration policies 
to stop this influx of Surinamese and to 
promote return migration. It was be- 
lieved that Surinamese migration to the 
Netherlands was typified by a so-called 
"follow-up" migration; that is, the 
migration process itself is facilitated by 
social networks of families and com- 
munities that extend across national 
borders in the Netherlands. This implies 
that once a key member of the family 
has settled abroad, the other members 
will eventually follow. The Surinamese 
government believed that return migra- 
tion was connected to social welfare 
projects, with special attention to the 
elderly. Thus, they believed that the im- 
plementation of return-migration 
policies for key family members, such 
as parents, would also stimulate other 
persons in the family to migrate back to 
Suriname. The validity of this theory 
has never been proven and living condi- 
tions were not significantly improved 
after independence. 
It is also possible that migration was 
seen by certain politicians as a mecha- 
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nism to rid themselves of "trouble 
makers" in the country. This implies 
that a negative attitude existed toward 
return migration policies. The increas- 
ing economic depression in the 1960's 
and the rise of racial conflicts between 
Surinamese and Dutch in Holland are. 
in our opinion, two crucial factors that 
caused the former colonial power to 
promote strong return migration 
policies. The systematic delay in the 
operationalization of these policies by 
the Surinamese government is probably 
an important and contributing factor 
that negatively influenced the Suri- 
name-Dutch relationship before 1980. 
During the independence negotiations 
in 1974-75, it was agreed that people 
would be able to travel freely between 
Suriname and Holland until November 
1980. Before that time, those who 
returned to Suriname with a Dutch 
passport would automatically become 
Surinamese after a two-year stay in 
their country. A policy to prevent fur- 
ther migration to Holland was im- 
plemented in 1980. 
Beginning in November 1980, those 
Surinamese who stayed longer in Hol- 
land (as for a vacation period), were re- 
quired to have a working permit with 
adequate housing accommodation as a 
precondition. Moreover, a visa was re- 
quired to enter the Netherlands. 
However, many Surinamese continued 
to visit their relatives in Holland during 
the holidays. A special agreement on 
the unifying-of-dependents again 
created many disputes because of the 
complicated family social networks in 
Suriname. Holland indeed was a second 
home for many Surinamese and in 
many cases, Surinamese became 'shuttle 
migrants' who did not belong to either 
country. This is very true for profes- 
sionals and academics who were almost 
all trained in the Netherlands. 
Against this background, one can 
understand how after the December 
1982 massacre, Holland was the most 
important escape route for Surinamese. 
At that time, the Dutch embassy soften- 
ed their entrance blockade for humani- 
tarian reasons and even offered facilities 
for dependents of those killed by the 
Suriname, an ex-Dutch colony, is situated on the N.E. coast of 
South America and shares borders with Guyana, Brazil and 
French Guyana. Its surface is 163,820 sq. kilometres. The country 
had 354,860 inhabitants in 1980 and 397,607 inhabitants in 1972, 
which means a decrease of 24,747 (6.5%) contrary to an increase 
of the population of 12% between 1964 and 1972. 
After its independence in 1975, Suriname became a republic and 
adopted in the House of Parliament the Constitution, which was 
abolished after the military coup in February 1980. Since March 
1982, the country has had a temporary Constitution, known as the 
General Decree All, promulgated by the leader of the "Revolu- 
tion" Commander Bouterse, L.T. Col. The state of emergency has 
created problems in the interpretation of this temporary Constitu- 
tion. The best illustration is the dispute concerning freedom of the 
press in the country. 
Based on the IV General Population Census of 1972, the 
Surinamese population is composed of the following: 
Hindostani (Indian Descendents) 37% 
Creoles (descendents of Africans more or 
less ethnically mixed) 31 % 
Javanese (Indonesian descendents) 15 % 
Marcoons 10% 
Chiiese, her-Indians, Europeans and others 7% 
Source: De IV Algemene Volkstellii, 1972 (IV General Population 
Census) 
junta. 
Dutch refugee policies 
Since Holland is a signatory to the UN 
convention on Refugees, the Dutch 
government recognizes refugee status 
within its migration laws. The relation- 
ship between the violation of human 
rights and involuntary migration is 
recognized. The receiving country aims 
at guaranteeing the refugees ('grootst 
mogelijke') fundamental rights and 
freedoms (Treaty 1951). With regard to 
Surinamese refugees, it is important to 
note the statement delivered by the 
deputy secretary of the Ministry of 
Justice: "Because of special linkages 
with Suriname, the Ministry of Justice 
deviates from the rules in not demand- 
ing refugees to present a request for 
asylum in the first receiving country. 
For that reason, Surinamese who 
entered Holland via Miami or French 
Guyana were not refused." Further- 
more, "Surinamese who were in trouble 
because of the brutal events in 
December 1982 can obtain a visa within 
24 hours and leave directly thereafter." 
However, Surinamese who entered 
Holland after the massacre are con- 
sidered foreigners, despite the specific 
relation that exists between The 
Netherlands and Suriname. Once in 
Holland, a maximum three month visa 
can be renewed for another three mon- 
ths. This implies that those who did not 
ask for a permit to stay earlier, or those 
who could not or did not wish to take 
such a decision with regard to their 
departure to Suriname, can afford to 
legally stay three extra months. If, 
however, after two periods of stay on a 
visa in Holland, the person decides not 
to leave for Suriname, a permit to stay 
and a request for asylum is required. 
Regarding decisions to grant asylum, 
"fear of persecution" or "threatening of 
security" (bedreiging van de veiligheld) 
are considered to be crucial criteria. The 
general policies are not based on a con- 
tinuation of stay for economic motives. 
There are no special receiving and 
guiding facilities (opvang en begeleid- 
ingsfaciliteiten) for the refugees from 
Suriname. In general the following 
procedures are applied: 
A stay in The Netherlands on a visa 
offers no facilities, and specifically no 
NON-DUTCH MIGRATION BETWEEN THE 
NETHERLANDS AND SURINAME 
YEAR IMMIGRATION EMIGRATION DIFFERENCE 
I-E 
On January 1, 1981, 25,000 persons were in the Netherlands coming from Suriname 
(not-Dutch). The numbers of persons, coming from Suriname with a Dutch nation- 
ality is estimated at 115,000. 
Source: Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS), Maandstatistiek van de Bevolking. 
benefits are available. 
Surinamese, who obtain a permit to 
stay or those who are allowed to wait 
for such a decision in Holland, can 
receive benefits based on a document 
known as "circulaire inzake bijstand 
aan vreemdelingen ." 
Surinamese with refugee status (A- or 
B-status) are eligible for benefits and are 
offered housing facilities. 
Those who obtained the Astatus can 
even receive a government scholarship, 
known as "rijksstudietoelage". Surina- 
mese involuntary migrants, who enter- 
ed Holland after the massacre of De- 
cember 1982, can be placed in the fol- 
lowing categories according to Dutch 
refugee policies: 
a. Refugees with a formal status 
(Astatus) Facilities: housing, bene- 
fits, study grant. (rijks-studietoelage) 
b. Refugees with a formal status 
(B-status) of: Facilities: housing, 
benefits (bijstand), financial aid. 
c. Refugees on humanitarian criteria. 
No formal refugee status, facilities 
limited to financial aid. 
d.  Refugees without any specific 
status. Formally tourists on a visa 
with a permit to stay a maximum of 6 
months. 
e. Surinamese refugees of Dutch na- 
tionality. All facilities normally of- 
fered to Dutch. 
f .  Military refugees. Those who have 
a permit to stay can join the Dutch 
army after naturalization. 
g. Surinamese who returned to their 
countrv with the aid of the Dutch 
government (return migrants) and 
may become unemployed because of 
the postponement of Dutch develop- 
ment aid. No special policies. Treated 
as normal cases. 
h. Surinamese without manifest 
escape motives (duidelijke vlucht- 
motieven). (Tourists on a visa). 
Involuntary Migration: a 
response on violence 
and oppression 
Between December 1982 and March 26, 
1983, 4107 Surinamese applied for a 
visa at the Dutch Embassy in Suriname; 
1444 visas were compiled. Of the 1444 
persons with a visa, 125 requested a per- 
mit to stay in Holland and 45 persons 
obtained this permit. (Sept. 1983). It is 
important to note that 65% of those 
who tried to escape to Holland after the 
massacre were unable to do so because 
the Dutch embassy refused to deliver 
them a visa. Moreover, only 45 (0.03%) 
who successfully obtained a visa receiv- 
ed a permit to stay in Holland. (Sept. 7, 
1983). It is true that 125 persons re- 
quested a permit to stay, but the in- 
creased fear and uncertainty in Suri- 
name does not indicate that the majori- 
ty of people who left the country in 
December preferred to return home. It 
is probable that most of these people 
had no choice: they could either leave 
the Netherlands or go into hiding. 
Regarding this last category, the Dutch 
statement, "Surinamese who left their 
country because of reasons of security, 
can stay in Holland as long as this is re- 
quired ..." appears to be false. The 
assertion: "Also Surinamese who are il- 
legal in Holland and who fear persecu- 
tion if they are sent back, have the 
possibility to ask for a permit.. .", may 
also be misleading. Since the maximum 
legal stay in Holland was 6 months in 
September 1983, we must conclude that 
almost all the Surinamese (92 %), except 
the 125 who requested a permit, left for 
Suriname or are illegally residing in the 
Netherlands. It appears that Dutch of- 
ficials, civil servants (particularly at 
local levels), are badly informed and/or 
are not stimulated (by their attitude 
towards Surinamese refugees) to accom- 
modate refugees. On the other hand, 
many Surinamese are not familiar with 
these Dutch procedures and apply for 
refugee status in an inappropriate man- 
ner. Contemporary razzias on "illegal 
Surinamese" and their deportation 
make the formal statements by the 
Dutch government concerning refugees 
debatable. 
Although the government appears to be 
concerned with the plight of the refu- 
gees, in reality, discriminating policies 
were carried out except against the 
most privileged and educated Suri- 
namese (particularly those educated in 
Holland) and the top Surinamese pro- 
fessionals. In short, the Dutch govern- 
ment's statements concerning refugees 
do not recognize the denial of permits 
to most Surinamese who have tried to 
migrate to Holland. 
Profile of the Surinamese 
Refugees in Holland: 
An Initial Sketch 
Who are the ones that are referred to as 
Surinamese refugees? Do they fit the 
1980 UN definition of refugees? 
An attempt will be made to outline the 
characteristics that typify this Surina- 
mese migrant category. This provides 
more insight into several identified and 
unidentified problem areas from a 
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humanitarian as well as a policy making 
perspective. From the available in- 
complete information, we consider rel- 
evant : 
categories involved; age, ethnic 
background, occupation (military/ 
civic) social-economic position; 
status in Holland; legal, employment, 
accommodation. 
Approximately 400 persons have 
registered for a political asylum request. 
A few of them successfully obtained this 
status. Five categories of refugees who 
received their formal refugee status can 
be distinguished: 
1) Professionals (academics, journalists, 
businessmen, politicians etc.), who 
through their connections can find their 
way in Holland without the help of the 
Foundation for Surinames Refugees. 
They belong to the more privileged 
category of refugees. 
2) Spokesmen and leaders, usually af- 
filiated with labour unions and other in- 
terest groups. They have been organiz- 
ed in the Association for the Restoration 
of Democracy and accused by the 
military. 
3) Commissioned officers of the 
Suriname army. Together with col- 
leagues who earlier (between 1980 and 
1982) left Suriname. This category is 
represented by the top professional 
military of the country. 
4) Soldiers who escaped from the army. 
Most of them crossed the east border 
river and entered into French Guyana. 
They continued their trip from there to 
Holland. 
5) Students who were involved in dem- 
onstrations against the military junta. 
Most of them are university students. 
Of these five categories, members of the 
first three were the most successful. 
Soldiers who could show their military 
call-up received a temporary staying 
permit. Many students argued that "the 
re-organization of the University to a 
People's University within a communis- 
tic framework" (as was announced) is 
not acceptable to them. Most of these 
students are not registered. It is well 
known that the Suriname government 
only permits the transfer of money to 
students who can prove that they want 
to study a field not provided by the 
1980 February MILITARY TAKE- 
OVER 
March 
The First Military Government. 
May 
Government Declaration on Labour 
Day (promising): 
elections (general) within two years, 
a law on political parties, 
a new Constitution, 
maintaining of human rights. 
August 
Coup attempt by Marxist-Leninists. 
Participants arrested. 
Deposition of President (Constitu- 
tional). 
Adjournment of the Constitution. 
Abolishment of the House of Parlia- 
ment. 
1980 August JURIDICAL TAKE-OVER 
Issuance of decree: regulating power of 
Policy Center. 
1981 March 
Release of the Communists jailed for the 
coup attempt in August 1980. 
December 
Proclamation of the Revolutionary 
Front. 
1982 February 
Deposition of the P.M. 
Suriname: Some 
March 
A two-day take-over by Rambocus 
and Hawker: promising 
general elections, 
military back to their barracks. 
April 
Installation of the Second Military 
Government. 
June 
The foundation of a People's Militia 
consisting of many members of the 
RVP* later also PALU*.) 
First trained militaries from Cuba 
returned to Suriname. 
October/November 
Increasing protest of spokesmen and 
leaders of interest groups against the op- 
pression. 
University staff, administrive and 
technical personnel and students against 
the junta. 
Open conflict with churches. 
federation: het A.V.V.S. de Moeder- 
bond. 
Open conflict with churches 
Urging an association for democracy 
and return of the military to their bar- 
racks. 
December 
Massacre; 15 spokesmen of the people 
tortured and killed by the junta. 
government of Suriname. Like other 
youngsters, they are unaware of the 
procedures and the assistance they can 
receive to legalize their stay in Holland. 
Since they also fear deportation to 
Suriname, many of them prefer to go 
into hiding. With regard to the ethnic 
background of the refugees, there are 
strong indications that the majority are 
Creoles and Hindustani. 
Most of the refugees left Suriname 
without their dependents. Apart from 
the youngsters, a large number of 
refugees now have to deal with families 
that have split up. Difficulties with the 
transfer of money from Suriname to 
Holland make the often unemployed 
migrants more vulnerable in the Dutch 
society. The migrants whose depen- 
dents migrated to Holland often face 
housing problems. 
Future Perspectives 
We now know that approximately 1444 
Surinamese left their country involun- 
tary after the massacre of December 
1982. Most of these Surinamese entered 
The Netherlands as tourists; some civil 
servants were able to obtain a formal 
permit to leave. We have also 
discovered that a few of them were suc- 
cessful in finding jobs in Holland but the 
majority remain unemployed. This im- 
plies that in most cases, aid from rela- 
tives as well as from Surinamese and 
Dutch friends is needed in order to sur- 
vive while exploring job opportunities. 
Finally, an organizational framework 
exists which unites refugees who wish to 
Crucial Events in the 8 0 s  
University of Suriname closed down by 
the junta. 
Abolishment of the free press. 
Prohibition for newspapers and 
weeklies, and for broadcasting corpora- 
- tions. 
7983 January 
Anti-Intervention Committees (AIC's) 
in industries and business to identify, 
locate and fight mercernaries. 
Founding of Committees to demon- 
strate solidarity with the 'revolution' in 
parastatale institutions and ministries. 
(with AIC's function). 
March 
Founding of the Youth Militia 
(Organization to militarize youngsters 
between 12-16 years). 
April 
Installation of the Third Military 
Government chaired by a member of 
PALU . 
May 
Announcements at Labour Day of the 
extension of the council-network on 
several levels of policy-and decision- 
making. 
August 
Announcement of a one-party system. 
To be proclaimed at November 25, 
1983. Support of all interest groups 
and political parties expected. 
September/October 
Continuation of replacements of the I 
and I1 echelon key positions by RVPers. 
Decreasing PALU influence. 
Announcement of highly qualified 
ideological training by RVPers (for local 
and regional level). 
*RVP (Revolutionary People's Party) 
and PALU (Party of Poor Peasants and 
Farmers): Both competing Mamist- 
Leninist parties. 
Note: Events related to foreign powers' 
influence on local circumstances are left 
out. As such, the suspension of the 
Dutch and US aid after the massacre 
(December 1982); the Cuban involve- 
ment in the countries domestic affairs 
(since March 1981); the Brazilian warn- 
ing of communism and Cubans in Suri- 
name (April 1983); the expulsion of the 
Cuban ambassador and advisors and 
suspension of agreements between the 
two countries (October 1983) are not in- 
cluded in this scheme. The influence of 
these events on decisions made by the 
junta is, however, not neglected. 
return to Suriname. 
What will be the fate of the refugees? 
The answer to this question is closely 
related to the question: What will be the 
future of their country? We do not try 
to predict future events since the situa- 
tion is quite complex and there is a lack 
of information. But we can identify fac- 
tors relevant for monitoring purposes. 
In this respect, the attitude of the Dutch 
government, for economical and politi- 
cal reasons, is considered to be crucial 
because of its relationship with the junta 
as well as with refugee organizations 
that aim for the liberation of the coun- 
try. 
New developments in the Suriname- 
Dutch relationship became evident in 
December 1982 after the massacre when 
the Dutch stopped development aid be- 
cause of human rights violations. Fur- 
thermore, the anti-Dutch propaganda 
perpetrated by international organi- 
zations, particularly during the New 
Delhi Non-Alignment Movement meet- 
ing, worsened the relationship. 
However, since the establishment of the 
National Liberation Council in January 
1983, the Dutch have resisted having a 
Surinamese government in exile in their 
country, mainly because of their formal 
relations with the junta. As a conse- 
quence, the movement was curtailed 
and lost its political impact both in and 
outside of Holland. 
It is possible that the findings of a secret 
1981 Defense report discovered by two 
Dutch journalists concerning the in- 
volvement of members of the Dutch 
Military Mission in Suriname (publish- 
ed in Vrij Nederland) will influence the 
attitude of the Dutch. It is stated that 
the Dutch government was not inform- 
ed of the existence of this document. It 
is now evident that the advice given by 
investigator Major Koenders (i.e. to do 
nothing with the findings because of 
their negative effect on the Suriname- 
Dutch relationship), is no longer valid. 
This implies that the Dutch are free to 
begin a military and criminal investiga- 
tion. At this time, there are a sufficient 
number of Dutch and Suriname mili- 
tary professionals available in Holland. 
Moreover, a number of them confirmed 
publicly in Dutch television interviews 
that proposals were made by the Dutch 
colonel of the Military Mission of the 
Embassy of the Netherlands to elimi- 
nate the top army officers to over- 
throw the government. Furthermore, 
from Vrij Nederland stated that the in- 
volvement of the Dutch officers in the 
military takeover allowed the Suriname 
colonel to blackmail the Dutch govern- 
ment. Thus, "Colonel Bouterse needs 
only to threaten to make announce- 
ments of the Dutch involvement in the 
coup to have the Dutch cover up the 
aberrations which also occurred before 
December 1982." 
The attitude of the refugees themselves 
as well as their frame of reference are 
considered key variables. How long will 
their team spirit last? And how far is 
continuation influenced and even frus- 
trated by disappointments because of 
amateurism, reflecting a lack of know- 
how? Will their morale decrease 
because of set-backs of successful infil- 
tration of unreliable elements? 
In conclusion, more insight is needed on 
these key factors: 
a. The attitude of the Dutch: reflecting 
the societal embedding of refugees 
which informs us about the support, or 
the discouragement of their activities. 
b. Manpower: in terms of available 
know-how and support of the Surina- 
mese community in Holland. 
c. The attitude and frame of reference 
of the refugees, which is so strongly tied 
to their conceptualization of future 
perspectives. 
d. The means: this key variable is not 
really explored because of a lack of in- 
sight into these matters as well as the 
lack of any information. 
Continued on p.  10 
Suriname Refugees 
Continued from p. 9 
The thoughts of some leaders in exile 
are clear: Suriname might become a 
satellite of the Second World." 
However, liberation of the country and 
restoration of democracy should never 
imply the reestablishment of the 
pre-1980 status as a satellite of the First 
World. 
would reject the junta, and change its 
policy with regard to Suriname and its 
refugees as well as make contributions 
to recover the civil and political rights 
the Surinamese have lost. There would 
be solid support for Surinamese 
refugees and their organizations. 
Domestic policies as well as cooperation 
with international organizations should 
reflect this attitude. 
Closing Remarks 
From the findings of this exploratory 
study we have learned that the Surina- 
mese political refugees form a hetero- 
geneous entity. With regard to their 
future, significant differences in the 
ideological frame of reference and the 
attitude toward violence appear to be 
decisive. 
With regard to disputes on the applica- 
tion of political refugee status, this Suri- 
name migrant category meets the re- 
quirements as defined in the UN in 1980 
since "well founded fears of persecution 
because of membership in particular 
social groups or political opinion" is 
evident. As such, it is in the refugees' in- 
terest to explore international options 
for settlement and to work out contacts 
with other similar entities. 
As a proponent for democracy and 
human rights, might one expect that the 
Dutch government (especially after the 
findings of the 1981 secret CID report) 
In general, one can say that in societies 
such as Suriname, where a certain 
degree of militarization has taken place 
and where decision making and the po- 
litical machinery are controlled by a 
junta or heavily influenced by armed 
forces, a distinction between authoritar- 
ian and totalitarian governments, in 
terms of human rights and freedoms, is 
hardly relevant. In such nations, in- 
voluntary migration is considered in- 
herent to the transitional process 
leading to such governments. 
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Extracts from the 34th Session of the Executive 
Commissioner's Programme of the High Committee 
"Draft Principles on the Prohibition of Military 
and Armed Attacks on Refugee Camps and 
Settlements" 
Camps and settlements accommodating refu- 
gees shall not be the object of military or armed 
attacks. 
Military attacks on refugee camps and settle- 
ments are in grave violation of existing and 
fundamental principles of international human- 
itarian law. They can never be justified under 
any circumstances and must consequently al- 
ways be condemned. 
Refugee camps and settlements shall be used 
exclusively for civilian and humanitarian pur- 
poses. 
Military attacks on refugee camps or settle- 
ments should be expressly condemned by the 
international community and all possible action 
should be taken in the relevant bodies of the 
United Nations and other organisations to pre- 
vent such attacks or their recurrence. 
States in whose territory refugee camps and 
settlements are located, shall do all within their 
capacity to ensure that the exclusively civilian 
and humanitarian character of such camps and 
settlements is maintained and that they are pro- 
tected against military attacks. 
Refugees in camps or settlements have duties 
deriving from the refugeand protection granted 
or afforded to them by the country of refuge or 
the country of asylum. In particular, they shall 
conform to the laws and regulations of the 
State of refuge or of asylum, including lawful 
measures taken for the maintenance of public 
order. Moreover, they shall refrain from any 
activity likely to endanger the exclusively civi- 
lian and humanitarian character of the camp or 
settlement. 
Brief Notes: The Standing 





1. There was a large attendance, 
though not equivalent to the heights 
of the Indochinese refugee move- 
ment. 
2. There was much broader repre- 
sentation. In addition to the cus- 
tomary church, ethnic, human 
rights, immigrant aid societies, etc., 
there were representatives of Tamils 
from Sri Lanka, Assyrians from the 
Middle East, Bangladeshis, Ethio- 
pians, Salvadoreans, etc. 
3. The Honourable John Roberts, the 
Minister of Employment and Immi- 
gration, though invited, was not ex- 
pected to come. He found time to at- 
tend the wine and cheese reception, 
however, and indicated in his brief 
speech that, after concentrating on 
employment policy in his first three 
or four months in office. he would 
now be turning his attention to im- 
migration and refugee issues. 
4. Dan Heap, MP for Spadina riding 
in Toronto and the NDP critic on im- 
migration issues, was in attendance. 
5. Raf Girard stated. 'The visa re- 
quirement is a response to the 
number of refugee claimants and not 
the number of illegitimate claims." 
This statement seems to run counter 
to the Amnesty International policy 
that visa requirements should never 
be imposed on a refugee-producing 
country where there is no significant 
abuse. 
6. Seventy-five percent of the 
Guatemalan claims in Canada are ac- 
cepted. 
7. Michael Schelew claimed that 
there is a practice (contrary to policy 
according to Raf Girard) of filling 
quotas for specific areas even when 
individuals in that area are not in 
danger. 
8. In general, there was a sense of co- 
operation rather than antagonism 
between the NGOs and the govern- 
ment, and between the NGOs and 
the UNHCR in spite of differences on 
the refugee claim procedures. 
